IDI 19th ANNUAL MEETING
Harris Manchester College, Oxford – 21-23 October 2022
The Nineteenth Meeting of the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI) was held in Oxford, United Kingdom, from October 21 to October 23, 2022 at Harris Manchester College, Oxford University. This was the IDI’s third meeting at Harris Manchester.
The Nineteenth Meeting – the first in-person meeting of the IDI since 2019, held on the IDI’s fifteenth anniversary as an organization – was a remarkable occasion, an emotional, inspiring, anxiety-producing and generative reunion of friends and colleagues, during which the IDI paid tribute to its past, took stock of its present and looked to its future. Seventeen members attended either in person or via Zoom video-conference. The IDI also welcomed two guests – Peter McBride, a post-conflict mental health specialist and principal consultant for the Belfast-based PMcB, and Anna Zajenkowska, an adjunct professor and head of the Department of Social Psychology of the Maria Grzegorzewska Pedagogical University in Warsaw. Both Dr. McBride and Dr. Zajenkowska had attended previous IDI meetings.
In addition to its annual meeting, the IDI hosted a one-day training workshop on the psychology of societal conflict on October 20, 2022 at Harris Manchester. IDI members Gerard Fromm, John Alderdice, Regine Scholz and Vamik Volkan served as faculty.
What follows is a summary of presentations, themes and observations from the Nineteenth Meeting.
SUMMARY
IDI General Meeting: Day One
Introductions
On Friday, October 21, the IDI formally commenced its meeting in its customary form, with a welcome, introductions and opening remarks by IDI President Gerard Fromm. He began by reminding the group of its task: to bring a psychological understanding to societal conflict. Members then went around the room to share their activities during the preceding years, projects on which they were working, their outlooks both for those projects and more generally for their communities, and themes resonating throughout their experiences. Many members reflected on how transformative it felt to be together again in person after the long disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic was a recurring theme among member presentations – how the virus had affected members personally but also how it had changed the communities within which they operate. Members remarked about heightened anxieties within their communities, with one member noting that the pandemic, climate change and the war in Ukraine were creating a sort of perfect storm of existential anxiety within her clinical practice.
One Iranian member remarked about the turmoil within the Iranian diaspora, which was manifesting in a sort of purity test: one was either with the diaspora and its vehement protest, in response to the death of Mahsa Amini, or with the regime. This member discussed recent, well-documented protests in Iran over mandatory headscarves for women and allegations of brutality against protesters by the morality police. He also discussed efforts to establish back-channel communications between the Iranian military and business community. A more in-depth discussion of the situation in Iran, and in a number of situations reported in this initial conversation, occurred later in the meeting.
A Turkish member mentioned her research into the role of mothers in preventing conflict. Her comments were joined by the Iranian member, who recounted instances of protesting mothers confronting their policeman sons, and, of course, mothers are leading protests in Russia against the mobilization of more troops. The Turkish member’s second project had to do with identity at the national level versus the local level, and the question of “what makes a house a home?” She also discussed her thoughts on the conflict in Ukraine, Turkey’s psychological and diplomatic interests in that conflict and the significance of a recent formal change in the name of her country from Turkey to Turkiye, a change reflecting yet another claim by the government on its exalted Ottoman heritage.
A guest described the situation in Northern Ireland as “a basket case,” owing to the lack of a functioning government and paralysis between the governing parties, one of whom refuses to form a government with the other. He spoke of the cultural development of a sense of Irishness and the corresponding lack of such a development among many Unionists, which has left them with a sense of isolation from and abandonment by the UK, especially given resurgent English nationalism. He remarked on population growth among Catholics in Northern Ireland – an aspect of group dynamics also flagged by Turkish members when discussing the Kurdish community in Turkiye – and noted that the Brexit decision may paradoxically become a major factor in the unification of Ireland. This guest also discussed his own work on the effects of a history of political violence on the public sector in Northern Ireland, in particular as it has impacted the openness and candor (or lack thereof) within the health sector. He flagged up a famous quote from the Irish poet Seamus Heaney as emblematic of the numbing and corrupting effects of violence – “whatever you say, say nothing.”
Other members echoed these themes of division, challenge and change. One member appearing by Zoom lamented that the North Cyprus of his youth had “completely disappeared”, making for a certain loneliness, and that the omnipresent “Erdogan mosques” played the call to prayer so loudly that the water in the pools rippled. Another member, a practicing psychotherapist, reported being flooded with referrals during the pandemic from patients experiencing issues with anxiety, identity and distrust of authority. Her upcoming projects include a book on blame and the concept of collective guilt as a perpetuation of racism and trauma.
One member discussed his current effort to lead an organization studying the changing character of war. He mentioned his work with conflicts emanating from specific locations, especially the holy sites in Jerusalem, and how the ripples of those localized conflicts nonetheless spread throughout the Middle East and indeed the world. Another member recounted her battle with COVID-19 and how it had side-lined her work with group dynamics in Germany. She noted that the pandemic had seemed to crowd out the space one needed to think and feel.
A Palestinian member discussed her dogged optimism about a two-state solution within Israel. She maintained her optimism that, because an all-or-nothing approach had been tried but had led to nothing, perhaps an incremental solution, with issues addressed separately, held more possibilities. She did note a troubling increase in youth violence on either side of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Nonetheless, “if you think about it in a rational way, it can get solved,” she said. Emotion, history and mythology get in the way. An American member noted that the rational, step-by-step process of the rule of law was producing good results in the US, referring to both the Alex Jones case and the procedural integrity of Merrick Garland’s Justice Department in investigating Donald Trump. An Israeli colleague spoke about his ongoing work with groups in conflict, the sustained stress of these conflicts and the deep need not to be separated from one’s own group, which is a factor in how intractable the Israel-Palestine conflict can be.
An American psychoanalyst spoke of his work with groups around the idea of “citizenship” in America. He spoke about the need to find someone to blame when the world becomes “incomprehensible.” He spoke of a consultation he had given to a group and how a female African-American member had told him “when you speak, my mind goes blank.” Accepting this negative projection and the conversation that followed made him feel that he was “joining the history” she carried. He also spoke of his own discovery that his grandparents had emigrated from Ukraine, not Russia, as he had grown up believing. He studied Russian in college and joined the Russian choir. He noted a sense of a generational division within Ukraine – with older Ukrainians having a harder time identifying as Ukrainian than the younger generation. He spoke of consultations he had done with Ukrainian therapists, and of those therapists’ reports of bombs falling in the background during their treatment sessions, or of one therapist who was treating a mother holding a dying child.
A member who works in a clinical psychiatric hospital reported residents withdrawing from positions of leadership during the pandemic and displaying high levels of apathy, paranoia and distrust. She discussed the hospital’s decision to hold a community meeting to determine whether the community was drifting away from its values, and also how much the staff’s decisions during the Covid period had invited apathy by leaving out patient input. A guest who works in a pedagogical university in Poland noted that, there, everything that was good was automatically linked to something that was bad. She noted that life in Poland feels like it proceeds with general normalcy until she realizes that ¼ of her children’s school class is made up of Ukrainian refugee children. She continues her work on Reflective Citizenship, a project designed to help citizen groups develop their thoughts and feelings about what is happening in their society. This form of thoughtful “witnessing,” she suggested, is exactly what cannot happen in Russia now. A Russian member commented that the war has brought only ruin and that Russians currently live in an Orwellian world.
A member spoke about his participation in a conference on trauma in Lithuania, noting that Communist rule in Ukraine had resulted in a “deep freeze” of guilt over Ukraine’s role in World War II and when that deep freeze ended, the national identity had to confront the moral injury of its participation in atrocities. He spoke of “time collapse” as a danger in regressed society, but also that a version of time collapse is a way forward; psychotherapy and reflective-space work in general rely on re-experiencing a conflict in a contained way, so that it can be understood in a live way. This kind of experiential learning can be much deeper and more lasting than ordinary conceptual learning. He discussed the politicization of mental health in the United States and the way that stresses are medicalized into “disorders” to be treated, rather than understood as responses to collective anxiety (especially post-COVID). Another member spoke of his work with large groups of Ukrainians, many of whom were in the midst of significant trauma and were reforming their sense of individual and national identity in response to the conflict with Russia.
Northern Ireland
After lunch, two colleagues led a presentation on Northern Ireland. It began with the premise that the structures of the Good Friday Agreement were primarily intended to end the violence between Nationalists and Unionists. While the Good Friday Agreement succeeded in that regard – no small feat – the structures have often struggled to provide adequate self-governance going forward. The current political situation in Northern Ireland reflects stagnation in the relationship-building needed to form an effective power-sharing government.
Unionists, whose political identity is fragmented and unmoored, do not want to negotiate to form a government with Sinn Fein. Historically, their identity includes a sense of entitlement, which is now existentially threatened. They feel abandoned by the UK, especially with the death of the Queen. All of this is exacerbated by Brexit dynamics, which remain in an unresolved state. Nationalist Catholics in Northern Ireland have grown into being, for the first time, the majority group. While historically this group has identified as victimized, they are now in a position to take up agency. The political and cultural stressors that existed during the Troubles have faded, to some degree, as peace has brought relative prosperity to Belfast. While the current situation is enormously frustrating, no one expects a return to organized violence.
One of the barriers to communication between the two major parties – and to finding a way to move forward – is the failure so far to imagine what a negotiated outcome would look like from the majority party’s point of view. As Republicans take the majority and in the context of the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, what offer could they make to Unionists, in a concrete thought-through fashion, about what a unified Ireland might look like? And how would it take into account the concerns, traditions and identity of Unionists? One member was invited to help Republicans think this through, and he received considerable consultation from other IDI members. He found himself keeping in mind the injury some East Germans felt at the time of that country’s reunification: that, without asking, the West simply assumed the East would want to join them, and, even if they did, what about the ideals related to Communism that some still held.
Israel and the Palestinian Territories
After coffee, the IDI received an update on the situation in Israel and the Palestinian Territories from a Palestinian member who practices law in the West Bank. This presentation began by noting that the last 20 years of “negotiation” had not resulted in a negotiated solution. Rather, it has resulted in a stalemate that is unstable and unsustainable. From the Israeli perspective, the stalemate has “succeeded” as a form of conflict management, but the success is illusory. There are greater and greater episodes of violence and polarization, especially among the younger generations of Israelis and Palestinians. Issues with Israeli settlers and around the Al-Aqsa Mosque are constant reminders of the tenuous status quo. The current situation does not deliver the stability or security that Israel seeks. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Palestinians is seen as illegitimate, corrupt and ineffectual.
An area of concern is the response to Palestinians from regional allies. Many of those allies have been alienated by Palestinian leadership and the fragmentation of the Palestinian cause. The Abraham Accords and the recent agreement between Israel and Lebanon have shifted attention away from Palestine. Agreements negotiated among Palestinian factions are not taken seriously. Meanwhile, the percentage of Palestinian refugees in other countries like Jordan and Lebanon grows.
This member nonetheless continues to pursue a two-state solution as the only rational approach. She was flying from the IDI meeting to the United States to make presentations on the dimensions of what such a confederation might look like – an open city of Jerusalem, secured by a joint police force; formalization and limitation of settlement areas, with permanent resident status for some settlers already there; land swaps for other settlement areas. The goal, this member said, was to explore and provoke thoughts on solutions. In that vein, there was a brief discussion of a “three-state solution,” meaning a way of thinking that separates the West Bank’s relationship with Israel from Gaza’s relationship to Israel. For all its drawbacks, this approach attempts to work around Hamas’ repeated efforts to spoil any progress Fatah might make with the Israeli government. In this scenario, the West Bank would constitute one Palestinian entity and the Gaza Strip a second state. We were also reminded that, if Israeli Arabs voted in significant numbers, the political situation in Israel would look quite different.
But the unitary identity of Palestinians, and the effects of fragmenting it, are major considerations. The discussion opened up questions of what is the Palestinian identity and who speaks for it? Hamas lacks moral authority and would not be accepted as a governing body by Palestinians. But Fatah’s leadership is fatigued, corrupt and alienated from its young people. Is the Palestinian identity inextricably bound up with its refugee status or status as the victims of occupation? In pursuing a solution to the current Israel-Palestinian stalemate, what might a post-conflict Palestinian identity look like for all parties? Our Palestinian member spoke of her work toward a joint narrative with her Israeli colleagues, a process of dialogue that may be as important as its product. We were also reminded of the importance of a third voice in stalemated or volatile dialogues between two parties; for example, in a project having to do with the holy sites in Jerusalem, it was clear that adding a Christian voice was important, not only for Christian interests, but also for the process of dialogue between Jewish and Muslim voices.
Meeting Disruption
In the middle of the discussion on Israel and Palestine, an extraordinary moment occurred. IDI President Gerard Fromm learned that he was in close contact with a person who tested positive for COVID-19 that afternoon. He had tested negative on a precautionary test earlier in the day but was feeling symptomatic. Out of caution for other IDI members, he immediately put on a mask, as did several other members.
The news of a possible exposure in the middle of the Nineteenth Meeting created a significant organizational and emotional disruption. Some IDI members are older; each member has his or her personal health conditions to consider. IDI meetings are held in small conference rooms for long periods of time among a tight-knit group of colleagues, many of whom have travelled significant distances to participate. Intimate side discussions over coffee and meals are an integral part of the IDI process, enabling members to discuss and process the emotional moments that often occur in the larger group.
In some ways, the anxiety around possible COVID-19 exposure at the Nineteenth Meeting mirrored the anxieties many members reported seeing in their own lives and practices. Plans and structures were thrown into doubt. Despite repeated negative tests, Dr. Fromm, the chair of the meeting, made the decision to remain in his hotel room and attend the remainder of the meeting virtually. IDI President Emeritus Vamik Volkan was already attending virtually. A void of leadership and organization presented itself, one that felt particularly acute given that a discussion about the future of IDI was scheduled for Day Two of the meeting.
Confronting this void, IDI members initially fragmented. While Day One presentations continued – with a fascinating discussion led by an Israeli member about psychological dynamics in Israel, frustration with political stagnation and a competition for victimhood between Israelis and Palestinians – uncertainty hung over the meeting.
Despite the anxiety, Day One concluded with a group dinner in the Harris Manchester dining hall, after which some members met for drinks in the hotel bar to discuss the day’s events.
IDI General Meeting: Day Two
Day Two began somewhat chaotically. With Dr. Fromm and Vamik Volkan both participating virtually, Lord John Alderdice stepped in to chair the meeting. Technology issues had to be reworked to account for physical absences, and a group dinner for that evening was cancelled due to COVID concerns and related availability. Additionally, with uncertainty about exposure hovering over the meeting and several members opting to depart early, a decision was made to cancel the scheduled Day Three half-session.
These changes, and the COVID issues that preceded them, contributed to palpable anxiety within the group. Cognizant of that anxiety, we continued.
Russia and Ukraine
Day Two’s first presentation came from two Russian members who were appearing virtually via Zoom. They reported an erosion in the sense of national identity in Russia and an acceptance that the illusion of a small victorious war in Ukraine is finished. They echoed the themes of fragmentation and isolation heard in earlier presentations. There is no “patriotic identity now; only survival.” For a vast number of people in Russia, “lonely men who prefer to believe,” now “the war has come home.” These members described the situation as an “imposed trauma” rather than a chosen one, a trauma that has robbed many – perhaps a majority – of Russians of their sense of the world order, their sense of fellowship and personal relations, their sense of a coherent value system. The critical point was the October mobilization – the first since 1941 – of recruits to fight in Ukraine. The question among Russians is why would you need a draft if you do not have a war? In addition to the brain drain beginning in February, 2022, the mobilization of 300,000 troops has led to the exodus of at least 400,000 men. While our colleagues did not predict a civil war in Russia, their usual optimism over national cohesion was weak. Conversely, Ukrainian national identity was coalescing. Indeed,as contrasted with Russia, the Ukrainian identity is consolidated and enforced. The Ukrainian mantra that “we fight not only for ourselves, but also for the whole West” seems important not only as political rhetoric but also in terms of mass political psychology. A Russian member noted that some excesses of anti-Russian national feeling are finding expression in the removal of statues and street names of 19th century Russian artists and writers (in addition to the removal of monuments to former political actors). This member noted the contradictions of such gestures and attributed them to a sort of despair and frustration rooted in recognition of the nihilism and brutality of the Ukraine campaign.
A guest practicing in Poland offered her observations on the conflict. She noted that while Russia is on one side of Ukraine, Poland is on the other. In Poland, she reported, nobody can believe that the average Russian supports the Ukraine conflict. Russia’s culpability and responsibility for the conflict seem clear-cut to her. She noted that the structures of Polish society have changed dramatically due to the influx of Ukrainian refugees, and that apathy, fear, anger and anxiety are all on the rise. She asked how everyday Russians, not to mention world leaders in the EU and the United States, could have supported Putin for 20 years. She reported finding it hard to speak with Russians now.
One member reported a consultation with a Russian therapist who reported that she turned to playing the piano as a bulwark against feelings of hopelessness and despair, but found that her right and left hands would not work together to play, a metaphor for feeling physically torn apart in her loyalties. A Russian member of the IDI stated that now “nobody cares what Russians feel but everybody cares what Russians do.”
Vamik Volkan steered the conversation towards a psychological profile of Vladimir Putin himself, the psychological aspects of the conflict emanating from the psychological makeup of the leader. Putin, he noted, had two siblings, born years before Putin’s birth, who died in their early childhood – one of whom was reputedly taken by the Nazis. In that sense, Putin is a “replacement child,” one whose job is to save the family and restore it to its former status. There is a time collapse happening in Russia between the 1940s and now – the attacks on Russia by the Nazis are being invoked as an excuse to invade and occupy Ukraine. World War II, and especially the siege of Leningrad, remains an undigested trauma for Russia and for Putin. The idea within Russia is still that Ukraine is not a “real nation” but a subsidiary of Russia, actually a lost part of Russia whose re-conquest restores Russian glory.
Another member noted that in psychological work, the process of allowing the patient to bring out the problem – and to come to an understanding of it – is part of therapy. From that perspective, Putin may indeed be unknowingly playing out a trauma-based childhood role. But, in psychological work, boundaries are also essential and must be maintained. In the political realm, however, the European Union opened its boundaries to Ukraine and in doing so destabilized regional relationships. One problem for western liberals is their belief that boundaries can be transcended without repercussions. A Turkish member offered a related interpretation. Putin, she argued, was saying that a modern world ruled just by the United States will not work. Putin was appealing to the idea of a Russian empire, and, without Ukraine, Russia cannot be an empire. She invoked the idea of building a golden bridge for your enemies to retreat over – if Russia can claim the Donbas and Crimea, she felt that this might end the conflict. Without such a bridge, the risks of a proxy war between Russia and the West increase.
Others suggested that Putin must be convinced that whatever military gains Russia makes are more than offset by what he is losing, e.g. by pushing Ukrainians into a cohesive national identity and pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO membership. All of this means his having to deal with multiple humiliations. Another member brought up the concept of “fakeness”: the image of a mighty Russian military doesn’t fit with its struggles and losses in Ukraine, and so disinformation at every level is mobilized to deny reality and maintain a grandiose image. This is an echo of the Potemkin villages of Russian lore, indeed a tradition of fake structures to protect a chosen glory. The danger for narcissistic leaders, to which Putin fell victim, is absorbing data that only mirrors their own narcissism rather than portrays what is really going on. A Russian member opined that Russia, in its own mind, has never been a nation-state; rather it has always been an empire, either growing or fading. Unlike Germany during World War II, however, Russia (among others) has the bomb now. How does this affect the calculus of maintaining a dream versus facing reality?
Iran
After lunch, the IDI heard a presentation on Iran from two Iranian members. They spoke of a timeline of Iranian political dynamics starting with the unrest in 2009. This unrest led to the election of the more moderate Rouhani administration in 2013 and the development of a foreign policy agenda culminating in the 2015 nuclear deal. They noted that even the Supreme Leader endorsed the nuclear deal. For the first time in a long time, exiled Iranians were returning home to Tehran. When Trump exited the agreement, despair and feelings of betrayal followed. The Iranians stayed in the nuclear deal for one year after the U.S. exited. Finally, Iran exited as well. The Iranian economy has contracted by 11%, squeezed by sanctions, corruption and mismanagement.
The presenters noted that the protesters of 2009 are now in their 30s and 40s, broken-hearted and distrustful. While they are quick to protest, they are not hopeful of reform. The hard-liners point to the U.S. withdrawal and say “see, we told you.” The moderate forces are marginalized. For the first time, hard-liners dominate all levels of the Iranian government. Prior to U.S. withdrawal, the Iranian “battlefield” and Iranian diplomacy were not aligned. Now they are.
The presenters noted that Iranian disappointment extended to the Biden Administration, which could have restored the nuclear deal with Iran in January 2021 but wanted additional concessions. As a result, the so-called “breakout time” (time needed for Iran to enrich enough uranium for one nuclear bomb) has dropped from one year to one week. Iran is seeking to project power across the region, hitting targets “everywhere.” Iran has told regional Arab countries that travel concessions with Israel are okay but that sharing of intelligence, use of facilities or other defense concessions are off limits.
There was the sense among the presenters that the regime believes that any showing of weakness could bring the regime down. The regime will make concessions regarding domestic issues, like headscarves, in order to placate the population but those issues will not lead to revolution. As in Northern Ireland, the Iranian society will be reluctant to push out the regime until it knows what would come after it. Right now the biggest domestic political issue is the succession of the Supreme Leader. The presenters noted that if sanctions on Iran were lifted, it could supply Europe with oil and natural gas that would otherwise come from Russia.
The presenters also noted that when the revolution happened in Iran, the people who took power came from the margins of Iranian society – not from the ruling elites. Now those revolutionaries are the ruling elites; they have adapted to being in power. To unravel the regime, change must start from within families, and indeed families within the government community have sons and daughters who are unwilling to follow the dictates of the Islamic authorities. In fact, whereas in 1979, at the time of the Revolution, only 15% of the population was secular and 85% were religious, it is exactly the opposite now.
The presenters noted that the two identities – Iranian and Islamic Republic – were different identities. Indeed, Iran’s Persian identity long precedes its Muslim identity, and its Muslim identity is, to some degree, in conflict with Iran’s identity as a modern, educated nation. The headscarf mandate, which was accompanied by mandates against ties and short-sleeve shirts for men, was an effort to “correct” these Western influences. Now, there is the sense in the country that Iran as a modern nation should be “closer” to the U.S. and Europe but are mired in the dynamics and dated habits of the Middle East. There is also a sense that the younger generation of Iranians is better at coexisting with multiple identities and no longer believes that it should be told what to do. Indeed, it chafes at forced dependency on the “authorities,” religious and otherwise, but this demand for freedom comes up against the tradition of male honor within the family as well as male domination in politics. Strikingly, the Iranian diaspora in Berlin likens the veil to the wall and declares loudly that when it falls, so will the repression within Iranian life.
The Future of the IDI
Late on Day Two, the IDI turned to the question of its own future. Fifteen years since its first meeting and nearly three years since its last in-person meeting, the IDI has reached a series of crossroads: foundational, functional and generational.
As a first matter, IDI President Gerard Fromm has indicated to the IDI Board that he would like to develop a transition plan for IDI leadership going forward. The President, with Board support, coordinates the annual meetings, sets the agenda, chairs the meetings, ensures that the IDI has the resources to continue and leads the development of the organization. Dr. Fromm, who has held the role since taking over from Vamik Volkan in 2016, would like to facilitate a smooth transition to new leadership.
The group discussed the topic of IDI leadership – with Dr. Fromm’s participation – during this later Day Two session. The discussion seemed to engender a level of anxiety within the group, no doubt in part because Dr. Fromm was himself “absent” and appearing remotely from his hotel room. (Vamik Volkan, the IDI’s founder and first President, was also appearing remotely.). Members noted that there had been no consultation before the cancellation of the group dinner and the Sunday session. Dr. Fromm noted that the numbers for dinner had dropped significantly post-COVID exposure, and it was unclear whether members were comfortable going to a crowded restaurant together. He added that several members had indicated that they would not be present for the Sunday session, and it had therefore seemed appropriate to cancel it.
The group struggled with a sense of abandonment and a lack of clarity about what the IDI had become and where it was going. Some members described it as a “family” that has a reunion once a year at which members share their lives and situations and seek intellectual and emotional support from one another. Other members likened it to an organization, which has a specific task and ideally produces something valuable to others. A third definition – which perhaps most closely fits the IDI’s current functioning – is that it is a network of individuals with a shared interest but who carry on projects on their own and come together periodically for support and consultation. Which definition fits best and which one do members want? If a family, was it worth maintaining, given challenges with time, expense and effort? If an organization, what are its products and for whom? And what are the organizational implications of remaining a network?
Dr. Fromm noted that in many ways the IDI has become more productive than ever, with a series of training workshops, a book coming out in March, podcasts, lectures, a Friends list and a number of private invitations. At the same time, the IDI continues to be reliant on limited private funding, which is not sustainable, has limited person-power to pursue initiatives, and has limited access to entry points for consultations and interventions. In response to this, a number of ideas were mentioned about how to develop the IDI moving forward.
Members reflected on the role that the IDI played in their professional and personal lives. One noted that the group’s “expertise” was in creating processes through which entities could see the psychological within the political. Another suggested partnering with other organizations and perhaps offering a consultative service. Some members were reluctant to endorse the idea of an organization, expressing that they see the group as a sort of oasis that they visit periodically to renew and expand their thinking around large-group psychology. One member said that the group had developed a method through which it could study what happened in the room – how to recognize and process those moments when we inevitably play out our representative function in real time within the group – toward the goal of experiential learning. This member felt that the method had received less attention lately.
One member noted that there are also on-the-ground interventions that are happening and can be developed further. Another member worried that the IDI could become a self-indulgent educational exercise rather than a means to get involved directly in large-group conflict psychology. He did not want us to become “conflict tourists” who take in a great deal of information about communal trauma without giving much back. Yet another member remarked how he could see a clear delineation in his own work – his own writings and thinking – between the “before IDI” time and the “after IDI” time. For this member, the IDI added the psychological dimension that had been missing from his own processing of conflicts in his region.
Still, the questions lingered. Is the IDI a family? Is it an organization? Is it a network? What does it do? What can it offer? Who will lead it into the future and what will that future look like? Dr. Fromm felt the conversation to be both “pressured and excited” and welcomed the group’s efforts to own the IDI’s future. To close the afternoon, one Palestinian member suggested that the group might function as both a family and an organization – an echo of the “two-state solution” she expressed hope for during her earlier presentation on Israel and Palestine.
At the close of Day Two, remaining IDI members took up their own authority and organized to make two resolutions: first, that those members who were available would meet in the morning to carry on the work of the group in a Sunday session; and second, that members who felt comfortable doing so would go and eat a meal together that evening. Accordingly, a group of nine members wandered the streets of Oxford on a Saturday night until they found a local restaurant on the High Street that could seat them all. Over dinner, they continued and unpacked the day’s challenging conversations.
IDI General Meeting: Day Three
General Discussion
On Day Three of the Nineteenth Meeting, thirteen members of the IDI met, some by zoom, in a conference space at an Oxford hotel to finish the work of the annual meeting. These members included one in California and one in Moscow, a time difference of 11 hours. While other IDI members were unable to attend due to prior obligations and exposure concerns, support for the impromptu Sunday session was high.
Turkiye
The Sunday session began with a report from a Turkish IDI member working in Los Angeles. This member reported on a paper she had written with IDI member Robi Friedman on Turkish large-group psychology as seen through Friedman’s “soldier’s matrix”. According to this member, Turkiye is at a crossroads of loyalty and identity. Echoing themes heard in presentations on Belfast and Iran, this member spoke of an exodus of young Turks fleeing a toxic economy in Turkiye, with farewell messages posted on social media being met with “good riddance” responses. If elections were held today, this member noted, they would not be fair. Opposition candidates are missing and opposition voices are censored. Critics of the government risk exclusion from the broader social fabric of Turkiye. Pro-government media shifts the conversation away from the economy and toward identity politics, implicitly mobilizing the population into a “soldier’s matrix” mindset. Heavy investments are made in the military-industrial complex, especially in drone technology. Museums and monuments are now put in the service of historical revisionism and “infused with grandiosity.” There is a sense of an “empire illusion” taking hold, as described with Iran and Russia. In a divided country, themes that unite are “anti-Kurdish, anti-US and anti-Israel.” On the Kurdish side, several leaders are in jail and have been for years, contributing to a political schism between the PKK and more moderate Kurdish leaders.
One member of the IDI noted that he had not been to Turkiye in 5 years because he was fearful of persecution. He reported a stealth conflict in the Aegean islands between Turkiye and Greece, with increasing militarization and propaganda. As the conversation progressed, with similar observations about Israel, one IDI member asked “Why is this happening now?” Members posited the speed of social change, social media and economic fluctuations as causes, but also looked to less conscious existential concerns raised by the pandemic, the threat of nuclear war and climate change. Other members noted global power shifts, with America on the decline, China rising, African nations no longer relegated to poor and disorganized status, and the heightened importance of Brazil and Southeast Asia.
“We are surfing all these waves,” one member noted. “It is hard to maintain balance.” Another member offered reflections from a recent trip to the Dordogne region of France, where he observed a reverence for the ancestors and the way of life they had created, mostly in relation to the land itself. This sense of family-based and land-based identity was powerful and moving. He felt it as a “patrimony” cherished by the current generation, a concept distinct from both “privilege” and “patriarchy”. He wondered how this concept might provide a deeper understanding of identity and avoid flat rejection as the social fabric evolves in a liberal direction.
The Future of the IDI, Part Two
With these questions in the air and with the end of a challenging meeting approaching, the conversation shifted back to the future of the IDI. The group, again picking up its own agency, first discussed ways to balance the intellectual “family” model that some in the IDI embrace with the more outcome-oriented “organizational” model that others want to pursue. The members present decided to organize a task force to define a structure for this modern iteration of the IDI and put down on paper a transition from what the IDI is now to what it wants to become. Members Bijan Khajehpour, David Fromm, Senem Cevik, Donna Elmendorf, Ed Shapiro, Jerry Fromm, and Reuven Merhav volunteered to comprise the task force, which would begin by reviewing the SWOT analysis, prepared prior to the pandemic, and then meeting virtually to discuss it in late November 2022.
Members also suggested collecting ideas for consultative “entry points” – people and places with whom the IDI could engage. It was noted that very few of our members embody, in themselves, the psychological and the political, and so, few of us see clearly the possibilities and the risks in reaching for potential entry points. One source for entry points would be the individuals who have attended IDI training workshops and taken IDI thinking back to their home organizations. Other members suggested courses the IDI might offer at educational institutions – an effort that IDI members had begun pre-pandemic by assembling a “syllabus” of IDI working papers. Other suggestions included strengthening the IDI social media presence and website, following up more effectively on contacts initiated by interested individuals, and implementing a program of online learning.
A discussion was held about the formal legal requirements that the IDI must maintain for non-profit status within the United States and about opportunities for fundraising and outreach within the parameters of those requirements. One member suggested delineating various tasks the IDI needs to accomplish – like fund-raising and online programming – and delegating responsibility more clearly to individual members to carry out those tasks.
Finally, members discussed the ambient anxiety within the group over the prospect of losing the intellectual contributions and emotional leadership of several members of advanced age – founder Vamik Volkan most particularly, for whom travel has become more difficult. The group discussed the desire to nurture a new generation of IDI members, and to expand IDI contributions past the boundaries of the Annual Meetings, without losing the connections to its founding generation. The group took note of complex feelings of reverence, ambivalence, appreciation, mourning and hope for the past work of the IDI, the cohesion the group has shown over 15 years, shifts in leadership and direction and future ambitions, all of which are mirrored in the large-group societal dynamics to which the IDI attunes itself. Dr. Fromm was very grateful for the group’s work and its investment in the IDI’s future.
With humility, gratitude and renewed determination, the IDI concluded its 19th Meeting with a plan for growth.
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NEXT IDI MEETING AND TRAINING WORKSHOPS:
The 20th Meeting of the IDI will take place in 2023 at a location to be decided after Board consultation.
A collection of essays from IDI members will be published in early 2023.
The IDI welcomes inquiries from potential workshop participants, host organizations and others interested in IDI training sessions or other collaborations.
Further information on the IDI’s activities, including future workshops, can be found at: www.internationaldialogueinitiative.com/training.